However, to counter any threats, we regularly take actions to increase the security of our systems and to protect our employee, customer and program data,» he said. «We have policies and procedures in place to mitigate the cyber threats to our business, and we remain confident in the integrity of our robust, multilayered information systems security.»
RSA strongly urges customers to follow both these overall recommendations and the recommendations available in the best practices guides linked to this note.
We recommend customers increase their focus on security for social media applications and the use of those applications and websites by anyone with access to their critical networks.
We recommend customers enforce strong password and pin policies.
We recommend customers follow the rule of least privilege when assigning roles and responsibilities to security administrators.
We recommend customers re-educate employees on the importance of avoiding suspicious emails, and remind them not to provide user names or other credentials to anyone without verifying that person’s identity and authority. Employees should not comply with email or phone-based requests for credentials and should report any such attempts.
We recommend customers pay special attention to security around their active directories, making full use of their SIEM products and also implementing two-factor authentication to control access to active directories.
We recommend customers watch closely for changes in user privilege levels and access rights using security monitoring technologies such as SIEM, and consider adding more levels of manual approval for those changes.
We recommend customers harden, closely monitor, and limit remote and physical access to infrastructure that is hosting critical security software.
We recommend customers examine their help desk practices for information leakage that could help an attacker perform a social engineering attack.
We recommend customers update their security products and the operating systems hosting them with the latest patches.»
He said (I’m paraphrasing) that we should stop worrying about whether or not video games are «Art,» but instead think of them as the new medium for creative expression in the 21st century.»
… you’re convinced that if you rest more than one day, your muscles will atrophy, your ultra-fit body will turn into a pile of goo and everyone in your age group will beat you.
Human(?) behaviour
… you’re a professional copywriter and add your articles and race reports appeared on Triathlete on your portfolio.
… you would like to be called «Scott» but not sure if instead of your first name or if instead of your family name.
… you’ve gone running in dress/work socks and/or your only pair of under-wear rather than skip a noontime workout just because you forgot these
items.
… you go back to the office without these items *or* wearing them sweaty, *and* you’re darned glad you didn’t have to skip the workout just to
have dry work clothes. (corollary to the one before)
… tell your minister you can only make it to church on Sunday’s in the off season… Which will be after this one more race….
… you ride your bike to the start of a local 10k, and on being questioned, you explain that you need a good warm up.
… you leave work on Friday your boss requests that: «You don’t break anything at one of those ‘athlon things».
… you grin while thinking that Ben and Jerry’s ‘Chubby Hubby’ really is a dietary requirement.
As with previous seizures, ICE convinced a District Court judge to sign a seizure warrant, and then contacted the domain registries to point the domains in question to a server that hosts the warning message. However, somewhere in this process a mistake was made and as a result the domain of a large DNS service provider was seized.
The domain in question is mooo.com, which belongs to the DNS provider FreeDNS. It is the most popular shared domain at afraid.org and as a result of the authorities’ actions a massive 84,000 subdomains were wrongfully seized as well. All sites were redirected to the banner below.
…
A noble initiative, but one that went wrong, badly. The above failure again shows that the seizure process is a flawed one, as has been shown several times before in earlier copyright infringement sweeps. If the Government would only allow for due process to take place, this and other mistakes wouldn’t have been made.
A system that allows someone (the leaker) to release information to an organization (receiving organization) leaving no traces that lead to him. As a variation, the possible traces may be in the only possession of the receiving organization. In this case the organization either guarantees to keep them secret or destroy them effectively. At last it is a matter of trust: if the leaker trusts the system behind the receiving organization, he will relase the information. Otherwise, he will not.
A receiving organization that receives the so called “leaks”, verifies and evaluates them and evacuates them to the public or to some other organizations for publishing (publishing organizations).
In case there are publishing organizations involved, they add some context to the leaks and publish them to the public.
Today there are entities working by this model other than Wikileaks which, at least by now, haven’t attracted (much) public attention to them.
All these organizations have had some permeability within their workforce, they share some of the procedures, general systems and tools they use to achieve their goals.
At this point of time most look at the actual scenario these entities draw. Fewer look forward to future scenarios. When they do, most of the attention goes towards the implications in the specific field where they are being used in: international relations and, laterally, journalism.
But once the systems are in place and have proved to be effective (in the case of Wikileaks, the person who is held responsible exposed himself, it was not because of a failure in the system), why should them be kept bound to secrets related to diplomacy?
Once they spread (and they will), why not use them to reveal administration’s misbehaviors?
And why not use them to report the (naughty) private life of famous people or VIPs?
Or to circulate the life of your neighbor, at least?
By analyzing faces, gestures, and tone of voice, it is hoped that machines could be made to be more helpful (hell, we’d settle for «less frustrating»).
DDoS attacks against independent media and human rights sites have been common in the past year, even outside of elections, protests, and military operations. With recent highly publicized DDoS attacks on Wikileaks, and «Operation Payback» attacks by «Anonymous» on sites perceived to oppose Wikileaks, we expect these attacks to become more common.»
